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3Therapeutic non adherence: a rational behavior revealing patient
preferences?
Abstract
This paper offers an indirect measure of patient welfare based on
whether patients comply with the prescription they receive. Adher-
ence behavior is supposed to reveal patients’ subjective valuations of
particular therapies. We write a simple theoretical model of patient
adherence behavior, that reflects the trade-off between perceived costs
and observed regimen efficacy. A discrete choice framework is then
used for the estimation, ie the comparison of the incremental benefit
of drug intake between two regimens. Consequently, the empirical anal-
ysis is based on the identification of patient and drug characteristics
associated with adherence. The econometric approach is implemented
through a bivariate panel two-equation simultaneous system studying
jointly the factors associated with adherence and response to treat-
ment. The data come from a randomized clinical trial conducted in
France between 1999 and 2001 and comparing the efficacy of 2 trither-
apy strategies in HIV disease.
Both the theoretical and empirical results suggest that, for compa-
rable clinical efficacy and toxicity levels, a higher adherence level is as-
sociated with higher patient welfare, thus adding valuable information
to conclusions drawn by a mere biostatistical analysis. Therefore, from
the perspective of the patient, the adherence-enhancing drug must be
favored. Our results based on panel data also stress that unobserved
patient characteristics account substantially for drug valuation and
that the assessment evolves during the course of the treatment. Fur-
thermore, we provide a new framework for the analysis of adherence
data. The microeconometric framework highlights that non adherence
is an endogenous behavior, thus suggesting new ways for improving
adherence.
KEYWORDS: drug valuation method, revealed preferences, en-
dogenous adherence behavior, panel bivariate probit estimation, HIV
41 Introduction
Whereas the valuation of health care strategies is usually based on stated
preferences toward hypothetical choices presented in questionnaires, this pa-
per aims at offering an indirect measure of patient welfare based on observed
individual behaviors in real choice situations. The key assumption is that
observed choices reveal individual subjective preferences, and may be used
to assess consumer welfare. Our proposed estimator for comparing patient
well-being between various therapies depends on whether patients adhere to
(respect) the treatment they receive.
Adherence is usually defined as “the extent to which a person’s behav-
ior (in terms of taking medications, following diets, or executing lifestyle
changes) coincides with medical or health advice ”(Haynes, 1979). In this
paper, we will lay the emphasis upon adherence to medication regimens,
especially drug regimens in HIV disease. Since the introduction of highly
active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) including the powerful but de-
manding protease inhibitors (PI), adherence has become a major issue in
the treatment of HIV patients. In particular, numerous studies show that
medication failure rates increase sharply with decreasing levels of adherence
(Haubrich et al., 1999; Bangsberg et al., 2000; Nieuwkerk et al., 2001). Tra-
ditionally, health care researchers have regarded non-adherence as the result
of irrational or at best misinformed behavior. We argue that patient compli-
ance is a true choice made by the patient and that consequently compliance
rates reflect patient valuations of particular therapies. As a result, adher-
ence behavior may provide information that is useful in the evaluation of
the treatment.
Within a rational choice microeconomic framework, we begin by model-
ing the adherence behavior as the patient trade-off between perceived costs
and observed regimen efficacy before providing an econometric pattern for
the estimation. Relying on a discrete choice model, the empirical analysis
will focus on identifying patient and drug characteristics associated with
non adherence while controlling for the impact of adherence on health out-
come. The econometric approach is then implemented through a panel two
equation system studying jointly the factors associated with adherence and
response to treatment. Finally, we present the results of our estimations:
we lay the emphasis upon the major implications of our study as far as the
comparative assessment of health strategies is concerned; furthermore, we
underline to what extent our framework which takes adherence endogeneity
into account makes it possible to renew the understanding of medication
compliance and overcome some major methodological shortcomings of the
5large body of literature dealing with adherence data.
2 A rational choice framework
2.1 Valuation methods: indirect versus direct approaches
First it should be stressed that the proposed valuation method is based on in-
direct inference through observed choice behavior, as opposed to traditional
evaluation methods (Drummond, 1997) aimed at revealing individual pref-
erences toward alternative health outcomes by using direct questionnaires
presenting hypothetical situations (for example, ”imagine that you will have
to spend 4 months in one of the following health conditions. Please rank
them in order of preference”, or ”how much would you be willing to pay
for...”). The limitations of such hypothetical preference evaluation methods
to produce empirical values for QALYs (used in the cost-utility analysis) or
Willingness to Pay (used in the cost-benefit analysis) are well-known. There
is no clear incentive for the patient or the doctor to express their true prefer-
ence, the level and type of information provided in the scenarios may affect
answers (Berwick and Weinstein, 1985) and respondents may find it diffi-
cult to answer quite complex questions. Furthermore, patients are likely to
behave in a different way from their declarations. In contrast, the suggested
approach based on direct observation of adherence does not suffer from these
limitations as it uses a genuine behavior choice encountered by the patient,
thus being in line with a growing literature aiming at acknowledging the
information value inherent in patient decision-making (Philipson and Pos-
ner, 1993 ; Meltzer, 1999). Note that indirect valuation methods have been
rarely applied to value health care. When there exist indirect monetary costs
(eg transportation) associated with treatment intake, it is possible to derive
indirectly monetary measures of Willingness-to-Pay (Johansson, 1997). The
most common example of this approach is provided by the transport cost
method previously used for the evaluation of national parks and in the health
care field for the valuation of preferences toward mammography screening
for breast cancer (Clarke, 1998 ; Sandstrom, 1999). When there is no direct
nor indirect money cost associated with treatment intake as may be the case
within a clinical trial, it is not possible to implement the method suggested
by Johansson (1997) and monetary measures of WTP cannot be derived.
This article offers a framework to infer welfare in such a situation.
62.2 Another look at adherence
This approach makes us study adherence from the perspective of the patient
behaving as an active agent in his/her treatment regimen. Up to now most
health researchers have taken it for granted that non-adherence is induced
by an irrational behavior or a lack of information. Poor adherence has
generally been viewed as either a deviance (Parsons, 1951), a statistical
bias (Scharfstein et al., 1999) or a cost-driving issue (Cleemput et al., 2002;
Hughes et al., 2001) that shoud be prevented or controlled for. Very few
approaches are patient-targeted and what is missing from most adherence
analyses is a discussion of patient welfare. However, some authors point
out that compliance could be the result of a rational trade-off operated by
the patient. Before capturing the patient’s weighing process in a simple
theoretical model, we will briefly review the articles supporting some form
of rational non adherence.
A couple of empirical studies actually suggest that patients are respond-
ing to perceived costs and benefits, when choosing whether or not to comply.
In particular, patients’diaries (Johnston-Roberts and Mann, 2003) relate in-
tentional nonadherence and unveil that patients are weighing the costs with
the benefits of non-adherence. For example, poor adherent patients report
that they skip medications in order to get rid of unbearable adverse events
despite awareness of the severe health risks associated with imperfect drug
intake. Above all, the idea of a rational non-adherence behavior was concep-
tualized by such socio-behavioral models as the “health belief model ”. The
health-belief model (Rosenstock, 1974; Becker and Maiman, 1975) suggests
that patients are more likely to comply with doctors’orders when they feel
susceptibility to illness, believe the illness to have potential serious conse-
quences for health or daily functioning, feel benefits on health and do not
anticipate major obstacles, such as side effects or costs. Becker (1976) found
general support for a relationship between compliance and patients’beliefs
about susceptibility, severity, benefits and costs. However, note that the
whole notion of “compliance ”still suggests here a medically centered orien-
tation. The assumption is the doctor gives the orders; patients are expected
to comply. It is based on a consensual model of doctor-patient relations,
in line with Parsons’s perspective (1951), where noncompliance is a form of
deviance in need of explanation. A patient-centered perspective has been
developed by Conrad (1985). Conrad focuses on the meanings of medication
in people’s everyday lives and looks at why people take their medications as
well as why they do not. He argues that from a patient’s perspective, the
issue is more one of self-regulation than compliance. This patient-centered
7perspective regards patients as active agents in their treatment rather than
as “passive and obedient recipients of medical instructions ”.
To the extent that patients choose not to comply with prescribed ther-
apies, a gulf may arise between physician prescribing patterns and realized
patient welfare, which turns out to be confirmed by numerous studies. The
degree of observed patient noncompliance is truly surprising. Several stud-
ies put overall patient noncompliance at around 50 % (Sackett and Snow,
1979). Among HAART-treated patients, cross-sectional studies in Europe
and North America, have indicated that 20% to 40% do not fully take their
regimens as prescribed at any point in time (Chesney, Morin, Sherr, 2000).
This may indicate a sizeable difference between the benefits perceived by
physician and patient. In other words, from the patient point of view, the
optimal level of adherence may be lower than 100%, which is regarded as
the ideal to be reached for the medication to be fully active.
In sum, the evidence clearly indicates that patient compliance is an im-
portant empirical phenomenum, with far reaching economic consequences.
However, in the microeconomic field, very few studies have developed
a microeconomic analysis of adherence behaviors. Philipson and DeSimone
(1997), Philipson and Hedges (1998), Chan and Hamilton (2005) have laid
the emphasis on attrition. They argue that dropout behavior provides in-
formation that is useful in the evaluation of the treatment. In particular, it
is outlined that dropout behaviour provides insight not only into the direct
efficacy of the treatment but also potential side effects that may not be eas-
ily measured or are privately observed by the subject. However, attrition is
only a special case of non-adherence. In particular, dropout occurs only once
while medication non-compliance varies over time and can be regarded as a
reversible state. To our knowledge, only Ellickson, Stern and Trajtenberg
(1999) endeavor to develop an economic analysis of the medication adher-
ence behavior. Their proposed estimator of patient welfare depends both
on whether patients comply with the prescriptions and on the selection of
patients into drugs by their physicians. The authors focus on building an
econometric framework for the evaluation of benefits within discrete choice
models. However no estimation is provided due to the lack of relevant data.
In this paper, we will concentrate on the patient adherence behavior,
thus trying to understand the underlying mechanisms involving individual
preferences.
82.3 A simple model
Relying on the studies mentioned above, we assume that the individual
adherence behavior is the result of some trade-off between the immediate
and noticeable side effects that affect negatively her quality of life related
to treatment intake, denoted by q, and the treatment effects on her health,
denoted by h. More precisely h refers to the clinical and biological markers
of the treated disease (ie either viral load or CD4 cell counts in HIV disease)
whereas q refers to the lack of treatment-related adverse events or in other
words to the tolerance of the treatment in daily life. To take the trade
off into account, we assume that individual preferences are represented by a
utility function u(h, q), with standard assumptions (uh > 0, uq > 0, uhh < 0,
uqq < 0, and uhq ≥ 0). A simple specification could be u(h, q) = pi(h)v(q),
where pi(h) is the survival probability associated with health state h, and
v(q) the subjective value of quality of life, which may be interpreted in
terms of QALY. We abstract from monetary cost considerations since, as
far as individuals are concerned, treatments are delivered free of charge
in the course of a clinical trial. As already mentioned, this rules out the
estimation of money measures of welfare. However it is possible to measure
a compensating variation in terms of the amount of extra health that would
be required to compensate for a reduction in quality of life. Moreover, we
limit this first approach to a static decision set-up, that illustrates the basic
trade off.
We denote the adherence level by θ and the health state without treat-
ment by h. In line with the econometric specification (see next section),
we assume that the individual faces a discrete choice problem: either to be
perfectly adherent (θ = 1) or not adherent at all (θ = 0). If the individual
is adherent, then her health state is equal to h′ = h + k; k denotes the
treatment effect on health. Similarly, quality of life is given by: q′ = q− cθ;
c denotes the subjective costs associated to the treatment, i.e. the magni-
tude of the negative side effects. To sum up, the utility level is given by
u(h + k, q − c) if θ = 1, and u(h, q) if θ = 0. The following proposition
characterises the optimal behavior.
Proposition 1 For any level c, there exists a threshold level k(c;h, q) such
that:
u(h+ k, q − c) > u(h, q) if and only if k > k(c;h, q).
Moreover, k is increasing with c or h, and decreasing with q.
Proof:
9The patient’s initial condition is (h, q). For any given c, k(c;h, q) is
implicitly determined by the equation ∆(k, c;h, q) ≡ u(h+k, q−c)−u(h, q) =
0. Under the above assumptions on u, we have that ∆k = uh(h+k, q−c) > 0.
Set c > 0. For k = 0, since uq > 0, we have that ∆ < 0. For very
large values of k, either ∆(k, c) ≤ 0 or ∆(k, c) > 0. In the first case, we
set k(c) = +∞: the side effects are so bad that the individual is never
adherent, whatever the health benefit. In the second case, there exists a
threshold value k(c;h, q) such that the individual is adherent if and only
if k ≥ k(c;h, q). Notice that, since ∆c = −uq < 0, the implicit function
theorem gives that kc = −∆c∆k =
uq
uk
> 0. Moreover, we have that: ∆q =
uq(h + k, q − c) − uq(h, q) ≥ uq(h, q − c) − uq(h, q) (since uhq ≥ 0), and
uq(h, q − c) − uq(h, q) > 0 (since uqq < 0), and thus ∆q > 0. Similarly,
∆h < 0 (since uhq ≥ 0 and uhh < 0). Therefore, again by the implicit
function theorem, the threshold value k is increasing with h and decreasing
with q.
The interpretation of k(c;h, q) is straightforward. Indeed, the quantity
k−k(c;h, q) may be interpreted as an analogue of the compensating variation
in applied welfare economics: it measures the additional gain, expressed in
health units, obtained by an individual whose quality of life is q and health
is h who consumes a drug that has side effects (it deteriorates quality of life
by c units), but improves health by k units. Of course, if k − k(c;h, q) is
negative, the individual’s optimal behaviour is to not take the drug. That
k increases with c simply reflects the fact that, in order to be adherent,
the individual is more demanding in terms of health benefits when the drug
has very negative side effects. Moreover, a good health state increases the
requirement set upon the drug; finally, a poor quality of life makes additional
losses c very costly (again when the cost is expressed in health units). In
other words, this simple model predicts two main effects. First, for small
values of h, the marginal utility of health uh is large and an increase in h
induced by perfect adherence may lead to a substantial utility gain. Second,
for small vales of q, the marginal utility of quality of life is high, negative
side effects are very costly, and therefore the optimal behavior tends to favor
θ = 0.
To fix the ideas, under a QALY-type specification u(h, q) = pi(h)v(q),
straightforward computations show that the threshold function k(c) is equal
to:
k(c;h, q) = −h+ pi−1
[
pi(h)
v(q)
v(q − c)
]
,
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which for small values of cmay be approximated by k(c;h, q) ' c pi(h)pi′(h) v
′(q)
v(q) .
In particular, under the Cobb-Douglas specification u(h, q) = h1−αqα, we
have that the threshold function k(c) is approximated by: k(c) '
(
α
1−α
)
ch
q .
In that case, the adherence decision is determined by the simple rule:
k
c
≥
(
α
1− α
)
h
q
.
In other words, the benefit-cost ratio k/c must be large enough. Notice
that an increase in h or a decrease in q increases the slope of the threshold
function k(c); therefore, not surprisingly, it reduces the propensity to choose
θ = 1. Also, α1−α measures the relative weight the patient puts on quality
of life (with respect to health). The following figure summarises this issue.
INSERT HERE FIGURE 1
Notice that the patient’s decision is based upon her own subjective eval-
uation of (k, c). Hence, observation of adherence behaviour will provide
information about the subjective values of (k, c).
2.3.1 Empirical implications
The population is split in two sub-populations i ∈ A,B, depending on the
treatment they receive (A or B) . For individual i, the treatment effect on
health is denoted by ki, and on quality of life by ci. Assume that we observe
that the proportion of adherent individuals is smaller in group A than in
group B:
P (θi = 1|i ∈ A) < P (θi = 1|i ∈ B). (1)
Hence, observing (1) implies that P (ki ≥ k(ci;hi, qi)|i ∈ A) > P (ki ≥
k(ci;hi, qi)|i ∈ B). Under the linear approximation above, (θi = 1) is equiv-
alent to k
i
ci
≥ pi(hi)
pi′(hi)
v′(qi)
v(qi)
. If the two groups have been determined by an ad-
equate randomisation procedure, the distribution of (h, q) is identical across
the two groups, and is also independent of the distribution of the treatment
effects (k, c). Hence, if we denote by τ ≡ E[ pi(hi)
pi′(hi)
v′(qi)
v(qi)
], we have that:
P
(
ki
ci
≥ τ
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ A
)
< P
(
ki
ci
≥ τ
∣∣∣∣∣ i ∈ B
)
.
In short, a lower adherence level reveals that the benefit cost ratio is
smaller. If, in addition, the trial proves that treatment A is at least as
efficient on health , i.e. that kA ≥ kB, this immediately reveals that cA > cB.
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3 Econometric Implementation
This section presents the econometric method used to estimate the economic
model described in the previous section and to infer patient welfare from
adherence behavior. The simple model above gives that (θi = 1) is equivalent
to ki−k(ci;hi, qi) ≥ 0 or u(hi+ki, qi−ci)−u(hi, qi) > 0. We want to estimate
∆(hi, qi) ≡ u(hi+ ki, qi− ci)− u(hi, qi), ie the incremental benefit provided
by treatment intake (full adherence) over the alternative of no drug at all.
3.1 A discrete choice framework
We assume that consumer welfare can be measured by the “revealed pref-
erences ”of consumers through their observed choices. Extending previous
studies of the welfare benefits from innovation or product differentiation
(Berry, 1994; Bresnahan, 1986; Hausman, 1997; Stern and Trajtenberg,
1998; Trajtenberg, 1989; Trajtenberg, 1990), we develop a discrete choice
framework. The basic notions in these models is that competing products
in a given market can be thought of as consisting of different vectors of
characteristics (or performance dimensions), selling for different prices. The
utility of consumer i for product j depends on the characteristics of the
product and the consumer. Consumers choose their preferred product by
comparing the various options available on the market in terms of the over-
all utility that different products provide. The estimate of the value that
consumers place on attributes can be used to compute the incremental sur-
plus associated with the introduction of new products incorporating superior
characteristics.
In our framework, patients choose whether or not to consume the pre-
scribed drug at date t, ie whether or not to comply at date t. Let us
consider θit the dichotomous compliance variable defined above: θit = 1
(respectively, θit = 0) when the patient i is adherent (resp., non adher-
ent) at time t. The discrete choice approach requires us to identify the
various factors influencing the patient’s adherence behavior. We assume
that each patient maximizes the utility derived from drug consumption.
Let us note Uit(1, X1it, ε1it) the utility level associated with being adher-
ent at time t and Uit(0, X1it, ε1it) the utility level associated with not being
adherent at time t. X1it is a vector of baseline or time-dependent covari-
ates influencing adherence behaviors, including observed outcomes before
drug intake (h) and side effects before drug intake (q) as suggested by the
trade off model. ε1it is a vector of unobserved (by the econometrician) pa-
tient and regimen characteristics. The patient i is adherent at time t if
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Uit(1, X1it, ε1it) ≥ Uit(0, X1it, ε1it). The econometric estimation is founded
on the latent variable θ∗it, which can be interpreted as the difference be-
tween the utility levels presented above Uit(1, X1it, ε1it) − Uit(0, X1it, ε1it)
(i.e. ∆(h, q) ≡ u(h+ k, q − c)− u(h, q)).
Let us assume that the population is randomly split into two groups
A and B. The binary choice model could help us estimate a compensat-
ing variation in terms of the amount of additional treatment efficacy that
would be required to compensate for an increase in side effects. Indeed, let
us assume that the treatment group (new treatment versus reference treat-
ment) and side effects (whether the patient experiences side effects or not)
are used as covariates in the adherence equation and that the estimated
coeffcients are respectively a and b on these covariates. Let us also suppose
that treatments are completely similar except for efficacy level and that all
side effects are observable. Coeffcient a tells about the patient’s response
to all the things that are different about the two treatments. Coefficient b
tells about the response to side effects. Then the ratio −a/b gives the rate
at which the patient would be willing to substitute better efficacy for side
effects at constant utility.
Furthermore, the binary choice framework makes it possible to rank two
treatments in terms of welfare. The quantity [UAit (1, X1it, ε1it)−UAit (0, X1it, ε1it)]-
[UBit (1, X1it, ε1it) − UBit (0, X1it, ε1it)] can be interpreted as the incremental
benefit allowed by the consumption of treatment A (over the benefit al-
lowed by the consumption of treatment B). The estimation of the adher-
ence equation with the randomization group as a covariate enables us to
assess whether the benefit associated with drug consumption differs signifi-
cantly between both groups. The randomization guaranties that the groups
are the same except for the treatment received and that hence the observed
adherence behaviors do reflect different preferences regarding the treatment.
Up to now, we have developed to what extent patient compliance rep-
resents an economic choice which should allow for identification of the in-
cremental benefits of a given drug. We have suggested to perform the es-
timation within a discrete choice framework based on the estimation of an
adherence equation. The next step consists in specifying the econometric
model.
3.2 Model specification
Our proposed method to estimate factors associated with compliance must
account for the impact of adherence on health status, as specified in the
theoretical model. As a result, we study both the predictors of adherence
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and treatment efficacy simultaneously. The therapeutic outcome will be
observed as a continuous variable and handled as a dichotomous variable,
which is relevant in HIV disease. Unobserved heterogeneity between patients
will be taken into account through a random effects specification using panel
data (Butler and Moffitt, 1982 ; Guilkey and Murphy, 1993 ; Greene, 2003).
Finally, our method results in the estimation of the following system:{
θ∗it = x
,
1itβ1 + ε1it
h∗it = x
,
2itβ2 + θitγ + ε2it
εit =
(
ε1it
ε2it
)
=
(
v1i
v2i
)
+
(
η1it
η2it
)
= vi + ηit
ηit ↪→ N(0,Ση)
vi ↪→ N(0,Σv)
Ση =
(
σ2η1 ση12
ση12 σ
2
η2
)
Σv =
(
σ2v1 σv12
σv12 σ
2
v2
)
where hit = 1 if health status is good (undetectable viral load) at t (= 0
if health status is bad). We assume that θ∗it is determined by a set of ex-
ogenous variables, denoted by x1it, and h∗it is simultaneously determined by
θit and a set of exogenous variables x2it. Self-selection into a high adher-
ence behavior is captured through omitted variables. The error component
structure implies that error terms are decomposed in unobserved individual
specific effects vi and time-specific chance events ηit. Therefore endogeneity
is induced by either the correlation between patient-specific disturbances or
by the correlation between residuals. Note that x1it represents a set of in-
struments for θit. It should also be noted that the recursive framework (one
endogenous variable present on the right-hand side of the other equation)
implies that hit may have an indirect impact on adherence through omitted
variables.
3.3 Model estimation
Finally, we estimate a panel non linear simultaneous two-equation system.
This recursive system is logically consistent (Maddala, 1983) which implies
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the existence of a reduced form. Furthermore,it can be fully identified (Mad-
dala, 1983), i.e. there is a unique way to recover the structural form pa-
rameters from the reduced equation.Two main difficulties must be dealt
with. First, we are faced with dichotomous dependent variables, for which
standard instrumental techniques are inappropriate. Second, the panel data
structure makes the problem a bit worse.
We use a full information method of estimation. The estimation treats
all equations and all parameters jointly, thus ensuring that the most effi-
cient estimates are obtained. It takes into account the possible correlation
between the individual unobserved specific terms and the disturbances in
the two equations. A maximum-likelihood method involving the numerical
evaluation of exact log-likelihood (Lazard-Holly and Holly, 2003) and the
BHHH algorithm (Berndt, Hall, Hall, Hausman 1974) is used. It is im-
plemented through a specific programmation on gauss software (Huguenin,
2004). Though a similar bivariate specification was first used on panel data
for the joint study of health status and employment decision of the elderly
(Sickles and Taubman, 1986), it has not been much used since then and still
requires heavy programming.
We wish to emphasize that this way of analyzing compliance data through
a two-equation system composed of an adherence and an outcome equation
addresses some limitations of most current methods used in medical and
epidemiological studies. First, most medical studies treat adherence as an
exogenous variable, thus solving the outcome equation. Second, if the bio-
statistical literature dealing with the correction of the selection bias induced
by partial adherence (Angrist et al., 1996) takes into account the endogenous
nature of adherence, the most common strategy has been based on the use
of the randomization group as an instrument. Hence, we claim that other
instruments (included in x1it and detailed in the following sections) must be
used when the experiment compares two active treatments. Third, there is
usually no relationship between medical studies regarding compliance as an
explanatory variable contributing to clinical or biological endpoints and so-
cial sciences considering adherence as a dependent variable to be explained in
order to implement compliance-enhancing interventions. Knowing that the
collection of adherence data is common in medical studies, the lack of any
standard method for the analysis of adherence data may seem astonishing.
The structural approach that we suggest provides a unified framework.
Before coming to the results, we shortly present the data used for the
analysis.
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4 The Data
4.1 The CNAF 3007 trial
Data were obtained from the socalled CNAF3007 multicenter, comparative,
open label, randomized Phase IIIB trial which evaluated and compared the
safety and efficacy of two different HAART therapies in HIV-1 infected pa-
tients. It should be reminded that the main objectives of HAART therapies
are to induce immunologic (rise in CD4 cell counts) and virologic (decline
in plasma HIV viral load to unquantifiable levels such as 400 copies/ml)
responses.
In this trial, the overall strategy was to judge the utility of a “protease
inhibitor (PI)-saving regimen” for first line antiretroviral treatment. Pa-
tients were sequentially randomized into two groups: one received a new
combination of three reverse transcriptase inhibitors (one Combivir c©tablet
(lamivudine/zidovudine) twice a day, plus one Ziagen c©(abacavir)tablet,
twice a day)) whereas the other received the standard therapy including a
protease inhibitor and a combination of two reverse transcriptase inhibitors
(Viracept c©(nelfinavir) three capsules q8h) plus one Combivir c©tablet twice
a day, plus ). The simplified 4-pill daily regimen or two-intake regimen will
be referred to as CBV/ ABC and the 11-pill daily or 3-intake regimen will be
referred to as CBV/ NFV. To briefly summarize inclusion criteria, patients
(male and female) were 18 years of age or over, had viral plasma HIV-1 RNA
loads in the range 1000 - 500 000 copies/ml at the time of the screening visit
and were naive of any antiretroviral therapies.
The study was conducted from November 1998 to July 2001 at 60 centers
throughout France. A total of 195 screened patients were randomized and
underwent 48 weeks of treatment. Protocol visits were scheduled at baseline,
week 4, week 8, week 16, week 24, week 36, week 40 and week 48. The
study’s principal objective was the evaluation of the treatments’ efficacy
after 48 weeks of treatment, in terms of the proportion of patients in each
group whose plasma viral load had decreased to an undectable level. Health
status (Viral Load, CD4 cell counts, occurrence of opportunistic diseases),
toxicity (occurence of treatment-related side effects) and adherence were
evaluated at each visit.
4.2 Clinical Trial Results
For the purpose of our analaysis, all results will be reported for the per
protocol (PP) population, which only included patients who generated data
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while on the originally randomized therapy. For the type of pathology stud-
ied here, it is not uncommon for patients to terminate one treatment during
the study period (usually for tolerance reasons) and switch to the other
study treatment. In such a case, compliance data would no longer reflect
adherence to the originally randomized therapy. Hence, the PP population
included only those patients not having modified their initial treatment, i.e.
those who discontinued or switched antiviral therapy were not included in
the PP beyond the last dose of originally-designated treatment.
4.2.1 Comparable Efficacy and Toxicity
We first checked that subjects were initially comparable in both groups in
terms of demographic and health status characteristics (Table 1).
As far as efficacy results were concerned, it turned out that the simplified
regimen showed similar antiretroviral activity to that of a PI containing
regimen. Indeed 89% (95%CI = [81%,97%]) subjects in the CBV/ABC
group versus 90% (95%CI = [80%,96%])in the CBV/NFV group had plasma
HIV-1 RNA < 400 copies/ml at week 48 (Table 2). Though the aggregated
percentages of patients with good virologic outcomes became stable after
week 8, the analysis of individual paths revealed some state changes (ie
viral load increases after controlled periods) in 51 patients. Furthermore,
during the course of the treatment, the median rise in CD4 cell counts was
linear and also comparable between both groups (+124 cells/mm3 and +130
cells/mm3 respectively in the CBV/ABC and CBV/NFV regimen) over the
48 weeks of treatment.
As far as toxicity results were concerned, both treatment regimens were
generally well tolerated. 12 patients (13%) in the PI-free regimen and 11
patients (12%) in the PI-containing regimen underwent both at least one
treatment-related digestive inconvenient episode and one clinical sign of
lipodystrophy. Note that side effects popped up and vanished during the
course of the medication.
Further information on the trial protocol and results are available else-
where (Descamps et al., 2001; Matheron et al., 2003; Lamiraud, 2004).
4.2.2 Differences in Adherence behaviors
Adherence was recorded at each visit through two commonly used measure-
ment methods: the pill count and a patient self-administered questionnaire.
Tablet count was based on an inventory of study drugs supplied to the
patient and subsequently returned to the investigational site. As part of
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their taking part in the trial, patients committed themselves to bringing
all used or unused material back. Furthermore, an adherence questionnaire
was completed by patients at each visit. All questions addressed the 4 weeks
preceding the visit. In particular, the patient was asked to estimate the fre-
quency of lapses in taking medication.
Neither of these methods can be regarded as gold-standard methods.
However, we decided to discard the self-questionnaire for our analyses for
two main reasons. First, recent research has defined validity criteria for
self-questionnaires including the use of short recall periods (inferior to 7
days) (Miller and Hays, 2000). The 4-week recall period used in our study
totally violates these recommendations. Second, it turned out that as many
as 32% of patients declaring not to have missed any single dose were indeed
overstating their actual adherence level because they brought unused pills
back. To the contrary, some arguments in favor of the pill count included the
fact that it was an objective indicator ; besides it succeeded in detecting as
poor adherers those reporting skipped doses (the specificity of the pill count
in comparison with the self-questionnaire amounted to 95%), thus excluding
the possibility that some truly non adherent patients might have disposed of
extra medication in order to appear more adherent (Cramer, 1991); indeed
patients admitting non adherence must be trusted and can be regarded as
non adherers unambiguously(Farmer, 1999).
The pill count measure made it possible to compute an adherence rate as
defined by the percentage of pills taken out of those supposed to be taken.
Based on this continuous measure, the mean adherence level amounted to
87.7 % and the median to 95%. The asymetric distribution of the variable re-
vealed two groups of patients, adherent and non adherent ones. Compliance
was then summarized by a dichotomous variable. A patient was adherent if
the adherence rate was higher than 95%. This threshold is in line with the
medical literature showing that it is necessary to take more than 95% of the
prescribed medicines to maintain suppression of viral replication (Paterson
et al., 2000). Note that both the asymetric distribution of the adherence
variable and the medical knowledge suggesting that what really matters in
HIV disease is the ability to reach a perfect adherence support the use of
a binary adherence variable. It could be checked whether this choice might
have induced some loss of information concerning the factors associated with
adherence.
Descriptive statistics showed that compliance tended to decrease over
time though not linearly. Another interesting feature stressed by the de-
scriptive analysis was a certain stability of the decision whether to comply
or not. Individual adherence paths revealed that most patients could be
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classified as either good or poor adherers. Some patients remained in the
same state all over the trial. 30 patients remained perfect adherers and 24
patients remained poor adherers. For the others, some rare deviations oc-
curred in adherent and non adherent paths without any consistency across
patients. We assume that these brief state changes might result from in-
dividual events related to the experience of the treatment. Our estimation
on longitudinal data should be able to distinguish between the impacts of
permanent heterogeneity and the effects of time-varying events on adherence
behaviors. Furthermore, the percentage of compliant patients turned out to
be higher in CBV/ ABC group (simplified arm), with significant differences
(at a 10% level) at weeks 6, 7, 8 and 9 according to the Khi2 statistics (Table
3). Our estimations will enable us to assess to what extent the distributions
of adherence may inform us upon the valuation of the treatment.
4.3 An original and rich database
It should be stressed that exploiting the clinical dataset of adherence from
a patient’s perspective is both innovative and very informative. In partic-
ular, the trial framework bears three main advantages. First, it controls
for co-factors related to the patient-physician relationship. Indeed, all com-
ponents of the patient-physician relationship (framing of the questions, ...)
are defined by the protocol and should be quite homogenous across patients.
Second, the randomization procedure ensures that observable and unobserv-
able individual attributes are independent of the treatment group. Third,
it provides us with extensive individual longitudinal information. Conse-
quently, three dimensions of factors will be included in X1it in accordance
with the large body of literature dealing with the determinants of com-
pliance (Meichenbaum and Turk, 1987): patient-related, treatment-related
(side effects, intake of concomitant treatments), disease-related factors. All
variables that were found to be significantly associated with adherence be-
havior (at a 10% level) in univariate analyses were incorporated in X1it. The
variables that might be expected to affect the subject-level treatment impact
on hit (ie whether the viral load is undetectable or not) (Girard, Katlama
and Pialoux, 2003) will be inluded in X2it: demographic variables (age and
gender) ; variables measuring the extent of disease at baseline (Viral load
and CD4 cell counts); the duration of exposure to therapy (time variable).
Summary statistics of all endogenous and exogenous covariates used in the
final estimations are provided in Table 4.
Of course, we cannot avoid shortcomings inherent in any experimental
studies, in particular the fact that some specific groups of patients with
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general problems of non-adherence to regular medical follow-up may be un-
derrepresented in this sample. Furthermore, the clinical trial did not collect
such socio-economic variables as education level, income, professional activ-
ity which might have an impact on the adherence level though most studies
have been inconsistent in this respect (Meichenbaum and Turk, 1987).
5 Major findings and discussion
Separate equation results (performed with a probit random effects model)
and non linear panel simultaneous estimations are presented in Table 5.
First, we wish to comment on welfare results, which have been our main
focus of interest. Then we will discuss the factors associated with adherence
and the findings of the simultaneous system.
5.1 Welfare inference
As explained, the discrete choice framework allows us to interpret the latent
variable of the adherence equation as the incremental benefit provided by
treatment consumption (full adherence) over no drug intake (nonadherence).
Table 6 shows that patients are significantly more adherent to the simplified
combination than to the reference therapy after other covariates have been
controlled for. It means that the utility level associated with treatment
consumption is significantly higher in the PI free regimen (CBV/ ABC)
than in the PI containing regimen, whereas both regimen were found to
have comparable antiviral activity. This implies that a welfare approach
based on compliance may add valuable information to conclusions drawn by
a mere biostatistical analysis. In particular, we are able to interpret in a new
manner the situation when there is no significant difference between both
arms as far as efficacy and toxicity criteria are concerned, though patients
are significantly more adherent in one group than in the other one. In
terms of well being, the compliance-enhancing drug must be favored.To the
contrary, the clinicians of the trial were tempted to support the treatment in
which the adherence level was smaller, based on the rationale that a higher
adherence would have pushed the efficacy to upper levels in that group.
Furthermore, it is important to mention that a traditional cost-effectiveness
study performed over the same data set also proved unable to highlight any
differences between both regimens.
In line with section 3.1, we could interpret the ratio 0.52/0.82 as the
rate at which patients would be willing to substitute the new treatment for
more side effects. However note that the coefficient on the randomization
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group variable tells about the patient’s response to all the things that are
different about the two treatments (in particular intake frequency and not
only efficacy) and that some unobserved side effects may not be captured in
the observed variable.
5.2 Factors associated with adherence
Furthermore, our estimations make us identify a couple of factors associ-
ated with adherence. We show that the probability of being adherent at
t decreases when side effects are experienced at t − 1 and when the pa-
tient observes positive outcomes at t− 1 (as measured by a a positive CD4
response), i.e. before making decision concerning drug intake at t. Once
the CD4 cell counts have increased by a minimal threshold (50 cells), the
marginal welfare of taking medication may not be large enough for the pa-
tient to be adherent, i.e. the private costs associated with adherence may
outweigh the benefits. These effects are consistent with the predictions of
the theoretical models as expressed by the impacts of h and q to the ex-
tent that the observed change in CD4 counts can be regarded as a proxy
of the direct impact of the observed health status on compliance. The in-
direct impact of hit on adherence are captured through disturbances (see
next section). Note that in preliminary estimates (results not shown) of the
adherence equation, patients were found to respond to their CD4 cell counts
and not to any viral load measure, which might be explained by the fact
that the CD4 cell count is the measure that describes the natural evolution
of HIV disease. Other factors independently associated with high adherence
include a simplified regimen (as mentioned above), the lack of consumption
of concomitant drugs, a less advanced virological and immunological stage
of the disease before treatment initiation.
Our findings confirm a couple of factors that have been emphasized upon
in previous works. In particular, studies conducted in HIV disease have
found that nonadherence tends to be higher when medical regimens are
more complex (Stone et al., 2001 ; Trotta et al., 2002) or more precisely
when the pill burden is higher (Bartlett, DeMasi and Quinn, 2001); when
there are several troublesome drug side effects (Heath et al., 2001; Duran
et al., 2001). However, we do not confirm findings suggesting that non-
compliance tends to be higher when the initial clinical or immunological
stage of the disease is less advanced (Gordillo et al., 1999 ; Ostrop, Hallet
and Gill, 2000). More importantly, as opposed to previous studies (Weiss,
2000; Spire et al., 2002) we find that patients’s beliefs about the capacity
of the treatment to restore the biological markers are not associated with
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the adherence behavior after other covariates have been controlled for. The
microeconomic analysis suggests other possible mechanisms leading to non
adherence, even in the context of proper information, based on an individ-
ual patient’s rational outweighing process. This result points out intrinsic
limitations of popular behavioral models such as the Health Belief Model:
in these models, false or improper beliefs about the effectiveness of HAART
have been highlighted as major explanatory facors of non adherence. The
microeconomic framework has the advantage of implying that, even in op-
timal conditions, in which the patients interpret their biological markers
properly and have good knowledge of disease progression (which is quite a
reasonable assumption in HIV disease), they might still rationally choose
not to take their medicines.
Note that the occurrence of side effects, the intake of concomitant drugs
and the achievement of immunologic success are the variables that we used
as instruments. We have made sure that they do satisfy the properties of
instruments. We have checked that these variables are not correlated with
v1i (Mundlak, 1978) and with η1it conditional on v1i (Woolridge, 2002).
Furthermore it is reasonable to admit that these three variables are not
eligible covariates of the outcome equation and thus are not included in ε2i.
Indeed, within the clinical trial, concomitant treatments must be chosen
not to interfere with the antiviral activity of tritherapies. Furthermore,
there is no reason why side effects should have a direct impact on outcome;
the expected impact is indirect via compliance. Finally, in line with some
medical research (Katlama et al., 2003), we admit that the recovery of CD4
cell counts is not predictive of virological success.
5.3 The panel data and simultaneous equation approach
Our results based on panel data also stress that unobserved patient char-
acteristics account significantly for adherence behavior. These unobserved
individual terms may capture a part of the pain or discomfort that the
patient feels when taking the treatment medication, as well as a natural
propensity to invest in health.
Furthermore, the covariances between disturbances of both equations
are significant, thus confirming that it is appropriate to take the endogenous
nature of adherence into account in a two-equation system. In our data, two
contradictory effects play a significant role. On the one hand, the correlation
between time-varying residuals turns out to be negative. It suggests that
unobserved factors inducing a change in health between two time periods
(from bad to good health) may have a negative impact on adherence. This
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effect captures the indirect impact of health status on adherence behavior.
On the other hand, the correlation between patient-specific error terms is
positive. It means that patients who are structurally high compliers tend to
be healthier to begin with or are more prone to engage in healthier behaviors.
Thus, we show that there exist unobservable factors that are correlated
with one another and that impact simultaneously the adherence to HAART
and the virologic response to the treatment. This interesting and new result
confirms the need to promote an empathic approach to adherence (Spire
et al., 2002). In particular, it is necessary to better investigate the usually
unobserved factors that may have a positive impact both on adherence level
and treatment success and may have to deal with patients’experience in their
daily lives with the disease and its current long term chronic treatment by
HAART.
Most regression results performed on the efficacy variable were to be
expected. We confirm that it takes a couple of weeks to reach an unde-
tectable viral load and that there is still no difference between treatment
arms after controlling for covariates. The baseline immunological status
becoming a significant predictor of treatment success once the endogeneity
of compliance has been taken into account. However, note that adherence
was significantly associated with treatment success in the single efficacy
equation. After controlling for endogeneity, the adherence variable is no
longer associated with the completion of an undetectable viral load. This
astonishing result is likely to be attributable to the correlation between the
adherence variable and the disturbances. As a result, the effect of adherence
is overstated in the separate equation approach when endogeneity is over-
looked. Conditional on unobserved heterogeneity, the remaining variability
is so small that the adherence variable is no longer significant in the efficacy
equation. Other possible explanations may be related to the clinical setting
which reduces adherence variability and to the instrument variables which
might carry too little information in this dataset. Another phenomenon
could account for the adherence variable no longer being significant in the
two-equation system, namely a selection bias due to attrition.
At this point, it is worth checking whether our results suffer from an
attrition bias. In fact, 49 patients withdrew from the trial or switched to
another treatment during the follow-up period (respectiveley 25 and 24 pa-
tients in the CBV/ABC and CBV/NFV arms). If attriters are also bad ad-
herers, our estimations could be biased. However, we checked (tables 6 and
7)that patients having completed the trial under the randomization regimen
(n = 128) do not differ from randomized patients (n = 195). Furthermore,
the characteristics of patients did not significantly differ between treatment
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groups at week 48. These descriptive results suggest that dropouts may be
randomly distributed. In order to control for a possible attrition, we further
estimated a hazard function and proposed to solve a trivariate probit model.
Attrition is described by a hazard of the form Sit = 1(S∗it = x
′
3itβ3 + ε3it)
where Sit indicates non attrition, that is : Pr(observed in t\ observed in
t− 1,x3it). The estimated model is the following :
εit =
 ε1itε2it
ε3it

εit ↪→ N(0,Σε)
Σε =
 σ21 σ12 σ13σ12 σ22 σ23
σ13 σ23 σ
2
3

The system is estimated by maximum likelihood and the results are pro-
vided in table 8. Both ρ13 (correlation between adherence and attrition equa-
tion) and ρ23 (correlation between efficacy and attrition equations)proved
to be non significant. We can conclude that our results are not affected by
an attrition bias. Note that the trivariate probit model is not estimated on
panel data. As a result, the estimated coefficients are not to be directly
compared with those of the panel bivariate probit system.
5.4 Conclusions
This paper proposed a theoretical framework in which welfare may be in-
ferred from observed behavior. Within a structural and econometric frame-
work, we show that patient compliance behavior relies on a trade-off between
benefits and costs associated with treatment intake. This allows for the es-
timation of two elements: (1) the rate at which the patient is willing to
substitute better treatment for worse side effects; (2) the incremental ben-
efits of a drug consumption over the alternative of no drug intake. Such
an empirical strategy might be useful for the comparison of two alterna-
tive treatments. To the extent that compliance is increasing in simplified
formulations, a revealed preference perspective suggests that there may be
substantial incremental welfare gains associated with such ”patient-friendly”
therapies. Our method both complements usual efficacy and toxicity anal-
yses performed in clinical trials and traditional economic evaluations. This
approach may be usefully applied to other areas in the economics of health
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care where similar problems occur, namely examining those specific margins
where patients do exercise choice. For example, evaluating the welfare ben-
efits from invasive health care technologies such as colonoscopy could focus
around such decision making as whether to accept such a procedure or not.
It is worth pointing out that the welfare measure associated with adherence
in a trial context is going to be a non money measure of welfare. It could be
possible to use adherence to derive money measures of welfare if the person
were paying for health, which would be possible in an observational setting.
In terms of valuation methods, our results based on panel data have also
the advantage of controlling for patient heterogeneity. Indeed, two patients
with similar observable characteristics may value the same drug differently
beacause they may respond differently to doses or react in a different fash-
ion to prices. We also show that the assessment evolves during the course
of the treatment according the occurrence of side effects, suggesting that
traditional point estimates may be misleading.
Furthermore, our results put some new light on the momentous issue of
medication non adherence. An economic approach pointing out that non
adherence may often be a ”rational” choice from the patient’s point of view
would suggest new ways for improving adherence. Patient-targeted interven-
tions will have to cope with the involvement of the active patient who may
find the marginal utility of taking medication too low. However we must
recognize that our results may be closely tied to the specific field of HIV dis-
ease, caracterized by highly informed and involved patients. Nevertheless,
the framework could be easily extended to other chronic diseases. Another
important result of the paper as for the understanding of adherence is the
necessity to handle adherence endogeneity, which we did by estimating a
panel bivariate probit model. This represents a real advance in comparison
with current methods, though it must be admitted that our econometric
modelling relies on the normality assumption of residuals and let the endo-
geneity go through omitted variables.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the per protocol population at inclusion
CBV / ABC
n = 90
CBV / NFV
n = 89
p
Demographic characteristics
Risk factors
Mean age, years [min, max] 34 [18 – 68] 34 [18 – 66] 0.27
Males (%) 70% 64% 0.33
Mean weight(kg) 66 [42 – 103] 65 [38 – 115] 0.79
Alcohol addicted (%) 25% 22% 0.64
Health status
Mean viral load (log10 copies/ml) [min, max] 4,2 [1,3 - 5,5] 4,2 [1,3 - 5,5] 0.46
Mean CD4 cell counts (cells/mm3) [min, max] 377 [10 - 854] 462 [27 - 836] 0.01
HIV-related diseases(%) 12% 15% 0.64
HIV transmission(%)
Homosexual
Heterosexual
Transfused
31%
53%
12%
34%
48%
10%
0.71
0.50
0.65
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Table 2: Percentage of patients reaching an undetectable viral load(per pro-
tocol)
Percentages [95% Confidence Intervals] P (Khi 2)
Visits CBV/ABC CBV/NFV
W0 0% 0%
W4 59% [48% - 70%] 50% [39% - 62%] 0,304
W8 74% [64% - 84%] 75% [65% - 85%] 0,886
W16 84% [74% - 93%] 80% [70% - 90%] 0,623
W24 92% [85% - 98%] 97% [91% - 100%] 0,301
W32 94% [88% - 99%] 91% [84% - 98%] 0,623
W40 88% [80% - 96%] 89% [81% - 97%] 0,857
W48 89% [81% - 97%] 88% [80% - 96%] 0,833
Table 3: Complete adherers (n,%)according to pill count
Time
intervals
CBV/ABC CBV/NFV P*
W00-W04 42/71 (59%)[47%,71%]∗∗ 29/62 (46%)[34%,60%]∗∗ 0,17
W04-W08 34/66 (52%)[39%,64%]∗∗ 32/59 (54%)[41%,67%]∗∗ 0,8
W08-W16 41/59 (69%)[57%,81%]∗∗ 30/58 (52%)[38%,65%]∗∗ 0,06
W16-S24 30/51 (59%)[45%,73%]∗∗ 17/44 (39%)[24%,54%]∗∗ 0,06
W24-W32 30/53 (57%)[43%,70%]∗∗ 19/49 (39%)[24%,53%]∗∗ 0,08
W32-W40 30/53 (57%)[42%,70%]∗∗ 17/45 (38%)[23%,52%]∗∗ 0,07
W40-W48 23/43 (54%)[38%,69%]∗∗ 19/35 (54%)[37%,72%]∗∗ 1
W00-W48 230/396 (58%) 163/352 (46%) < 0, 001
*two-sided exact Fisher Test, ** 95% Confidence Intervals
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Table 5: Separate random-effects equations and panel bivariate probit model
ADHERENCE EQUATION Single Probit Simultaneous
equations equations
Est t Est t
Randomization group 0.53 2.4 0.52 2.41
=1 if the patient is in the simplified arm
Side effects -0.80 -2.10 -0.82 -2.27
=1 if the subject underwent side effects at t− 1
Observed CD4 change at (t− 1) -0.22 -2.20 -0.28 - 2.30
=1 if (CD4t−1 − CD40)  50
Belief that the disease is under control -0.14 -1.47 -0.13 -1.27
= 0....6 (controlled)
Visit -0.01 -0.25 -0.01 -0.25
=5,6,7,8,9,10
Baseline health status 0.48 2.20 0.39 2.03
=1 if (VL≤ 30000 and CD4≥ 400) at Day 0
Concomitant drugs -0.52 -2.16 -0.43 -2.17
=1 if the patient received concomitant drugs
Constant 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.32
σv 1.01∗∗ 0.99∗∗
CLINICAL EFFICACY EQUATION
Adherence behavior 0.40 2.10 0.75 1.13
=1 if the patient is compliant over t− 1, t
Randomization group -0.03 -0.11 0.24 1.10
=1 if the patient is in the simplified arm
Visit 0.29 4.83 0.32 5.33
=5,6,7,8,9,10 (LOG10)
Viral load at baseline (log10) -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.52
Constant -1.04 -7.70 -0.85 -1.88
CD4 cell counts at baseline (/1000) 0.99 1.62 1.18 2.10
Constant -1.04 -7.70 -0.85 -1.88
ση 0.73∗∗ 0.74∗∗
Covariance between individual effects (σv12) 0.35 2.50
Covariance between error terms (ση12) -0.24 -2.18
∗∗ significant
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Table 6: Comparison of initial caracteristics of randomized patients and
attriters
ITT Per Protocol at W48 Attrition P ∗
n = 195 n = 128 n = 67
Age (mean,std) 36.1 (9) 36.5 (9.8) 35.5 (9.3) 0.5
Sex (Female) 33% 30.5 % 37% 0.33
Weight kg (mean, std) 67 (12.2) 68 (12.7) 64.5 (11) 0.08
CDC A Classification 78% 77% 82% 0.37
HIV-related diseases 13% 12.5% 13.5% 0.85
Viral load (log10) (mean, std) 4.12 (0.6) 4.2 (0.6) 3.9 (0.5) 0.004
CD4 cell counts (mean, std) 430 (212) 428 (201) 432 (236) 0.90
Smoker 51% 54% 46.5% 0.31
Alcohol-addicted 27% 23.5% 33% 0.16
Risk factors of HIV transmission
Homosexual 33% 37.5 % 25.5% 0.09
Heterosexual 51.5% 51.5% 51% 0.9
Transfused 11% 7% 18% 0.01
Table 7: Comparability of CBV/ ABC and CBV/ NFV groups in the per
protocol population at W48 and W0
Per Protocol at W48 Per Protocol at W0
CBV/ABC CBV/NFV P ∗ CBV/ ABC CBV/NFV P ∗
n = 63 n = 65 n = 90 n = 89
Age 36.5 (8.5) 36.5 (9.3) 0.9 35.2 (9.7) 36.6 (9.7) 0.27
Sex (Female) 27% 34 % 0.4 30% 36% 0.33
Weight kg 68 (11.5) 68 (12.3) 0.89 66.6 (12) 67.1 (13) 0.79
CDC A Classification 79% 74% 0.46 78% 77% 0.96
HIV-related diseases 11% 14% 0.64 12% 15% 0.64
Viral load (log10) 4.2(0.53) 4.2 (0.5) 0.42 4.16 (0.5) 4.21 (0.5) 0.46
CD4 cell counts 397 (205) 457 (194) 0.09 377 (196) 462 (200) 0.01
Smoker 57% 51% 0.47 56% 52% 0.60
Alcohol-addicted 24% 23% 0.92 28% 25% 0.64
HIV transmission
Homosexual 35% 40 % 0.55 31% 34% 0.71
Heterosexual 54% 49% 0.59 53% 48% 0.50
Transfused 8% 6% 0.70 12% 10% 0.65
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Table 8: Trivariate probit model
ADHERENCE EQUATION Coef t
Randomization group 0.33 3.31
=1 if the patient received the simplified treatment
Side effects -0.42 -1.92
=1 if the subject underwent side effects at t− 1
Observed CD4 change at(t− 1) -0.22 -1.9
=1 if (CD4t−1 − CD40)  50
Visit -0.01 -0.30
=5,6,7,8,9,10
Baseline health status 0.28 2.8
=1 if (VL≤ 30000 and CD4≥ 400) at Day 0
Concomitant drugs -0.23 -1.68
=1 if the patient received concomitant drugs
Constant -0.31 -0.5
CLINICAL EFFICACY EQUATION
Adherence behavior 0.29 1.1
=1 if the patient is adherent at t
Randomization group 0.21 1.41
=1 if the patient received the simplified regimen
Visit 0.17 3.29
=5,6,7,8,9,10
CD4 cell counts at baseline 1.02 3.48
Constant -0.31 -0.50
ATTRITION EQUATION Coef t
Randomization group -0.26 -1.07
=1 if the patient received the simplified treatment
Viral Load Rebound at t− 1 -0.63 -1.95
=1 if the patient suffered from a viral load rebound at t− 1
Side effects between t− 2 and t− 1 -0.39 -0.82
=1 if the subject underwent side effects
Visit 0.07 0.82
=5,6,7,8,9,10
Baseline health status 0.27 1.06
=1 if (VL≤ 30000 and CD4≥ 400) at Day 0
Side effects between t− 2 and t− 1 -0.39 -0.82
=1 if the subject underwent side effects
Concomitant drugs at t− 1 0.51 1.86
=1 if the patient received concomitant drugs
Constant -0.31 -0.5
cov(ε1it, ε2it) 0.81 5.05
cov(ε1it, ε3it) -0.16 -1.27
cov(ε2it, ε3it) 0.05 0.40
